The Megalodon automated campaign pushed 5,718 malicious commits to 5,561 GitHub repositories, including @tiledesk/tiledesk-server, injecting GitHub Actions workflows with base64-encoded bash payloads. These payloads exfiltrated CI secrets, cloud credentials, SSH keys, OIDC tokens, and source code secrets to a C2 server. The campaign is linked to broader supply chain attacks by TeamPCP.
Initial Access
Malicious Workflow Injection
confirmed
Attackers used throwaway GitHub accounts with random 8-character usernames and forged author identities (build-bot, auto-ci, ci-bot, pipeline-bot) to push 5,718 malicious commits to 5,561 GitHub repositories, injecting GitHub Actions workflows.
Defender cut points
Implement strict code review policies for all CI/CD workflow changesEnforce branch protection rules requiring multiple approvals for merges
